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Abstract
We consider an overlapping generation model based on Matsuyama (1999)
and show that, whenever actual capital accumulation falls below its balanced
growth path, subsidising innovators by taxing consumers has stabilising ef-
fects and increases welfare. Further, if the steady state is unstable under
laissez faire, the introduction of the subsidy can make the steady state sta-
ble. Such a policy has positive welfare e®ects as it fosters output growth
along the transitional adjustment path. Therefore, fast growing economies,
in which high factor accumulation plays a crucial role alongside innovative
sectors that enjoy temporary monopoly rents, should follow an unorthodox
approach to stabilisation. Namely, taxing the consumers and reallocate re-
sources to the innovative sectors.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that processes of growth based solely on factor accumulation cease
at some point because of diminishing returns to scale of production. By contrast,
introducing innovative products may create new opportunities on the production
side. Innovation may be induced by the prospect of enjoying temporary monopoly
pro¯ts. Such temporary monopoly power makes the law of diminishing returns to
scale vanish and growth based on innovation sustainable [see e.g. the seminal papers
by Romer (1986, 1990) and, for a general overview, Aghion and Howitt (1997)].
Matsuyama (1996, 1999), among others, has uni¯ed these two approaches in a
single growth model, and has shown that "under empirically plausible conditions,
the balanced growth path is unstable and the economy achieves sustainable growth
through cycles, perpetually moving back and forth between two phases" (Mat-
suyama 1999, p. 335). These two phases capture the main features of the approaches
mentioned above: the Solow (neoclassical) model and the neo-Schumpetarian ap-
proach.
In one phase, when the growth rates of output and investment are higher, there is
no innovation. The economy is then competitive and the evolution of this economy
is the one pointed out by Solow. In the other phase, when the growth rates of
output and investment are lower, there is innovation and the economy is "more
monopolistic" as in the Shumpeterian endogenous growth approach. In the long
run, the growth rates of innovation and investment are equal, however they do not
follow the same evolution: they move over the cycle in an a-synchronised way. That
is, the economy alternates between periods of high innovation and periods of high
investment.
The mechanism at work is linked to the timing of entry of innovators into the
market for new goods. To start up production innovators need to ensure that the
market for their product is su±ciently large to recoup the costs of innovation. This
implies that innovators introduce new products into the market at the same time as
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their competitors. Delaying entry would mean loosing temporary monopoly rents
and make innovation not pro¯table enough. Therefore, innovative activities take
place at the same time, and prevail until competition among innovators builds up
and monopoly rents drop. As the economy becomes more competitive, more re-
sources are available to manufacturing activities, and both output and investment
growth increase. Higher output and investment will, in turn, build up a larger
resource base in the economy, which stimulates another period of innovative activ-
ity. It is this asynchronicity of innovation and investment activities that creates
sustainable growth through cycles.1
We rely on Matsuyama (1996, 1999) to study the e®ects on growth and welfare
of non distorsive tax/subsidy policies. In particular, we are interested in investi-
gating the stabilising/destabilising e®ects of policies aimed at eliminating economic
°uctuations. The focus on stabilisation originates from the observation that na-
tions and governments aim to reach high permanent growth without incurring into
recessions. We concentrate our attention on the issue of how subsidising innovators
(and taxing consumers) can generate stable sustained growth and higher welfare.
In this respect, our paper can be seen as a reformulation in a macroeconomic
context of the branch of the R&D literature that deals with public aid to inno-
vation (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992), Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) and
Segerstrom (2000)). In this literature it is often claimed that there exists a role
for public intervention both in subsidising R&D activities and enforcing property
rights to innovation as means to promote economic growth.
We wish to add a new macroeconomic perspective to this claim: Indeed we
show that in fast growing economies, in which high factor accumulation plays a
crucial role alongside innovative sectors that enjoy temporary rents,2 stabilisation
1Periods of high innovation are followed by periods of high investment, and in each phase of the
economy either innovation or capital accumulation play the dominant role. Moreover, as shown
by Matsuyama (1996, 1999) when the economy moves back and forth between the two phases
growth is faster than along the (unstable) balanced growth path.
2What we have in mind here are economies like Japan and East Asian newly industrilised
countries (NICs) like South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Japan experienced fast
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policies should follow an unorthodox approach. Namely, these policies should tax
consumers during recessions and reallocate resources to the innovative sectors.
In spite of the simplicity of the model, some interesting policy implications can
be drawn. In recent times the world has witnessed several fast growing economies
falling into recession. The so-called East Asian tigers and Japan, in particular, are
still struggling to ¯nd a way out of such a crisis, and the issue on the policy require-
ments needed to resume fast growth is widely debated among economists (see e.g.
Crafts (1999), Dornbusch (1995) and Ito (1996)). Most of these studies focus on
the need for ¯nancial and structural reforms as pre-requisites to resume sustained
growth in the long run. Also, there is a general agreement among researchers that
the high saving rates of East Asian and Japanese economies are becoming an im-
pediment to their economic recovery. Indeed, with pro¯tability depressed very little
of the relatively large share of income that is saved is eventually invested; moreover,
high saving depresses domestic consumption. As a result, standard expansionary
¯scal and monetary policies seem unable to trigger enough stimulus in aggregate
demand and investment. Our model suggests that taxing the consumers and using
the receipts to subsidise innovators may help to overcome recessions and resume
sustained growth.3
Our paper also demonstrates that a tax on innovators aimed at raising resources
growth since the aftermath of the second World War until the early 1990s. Until the 1960s
the main engine of growth was undoubtedly rapid factor accumulation; from the 1960s until the
1990s the main engine of growth of Japanese economy can be identi¯ed in the development and
expansion of high technology industry (see Odagiri and Goto (1993)). As regards East Asian
NICs, large part of their growth until 1990 was driven by rapid factor accumulation (see Young
(1995)). However, there is extensive evidence of the emerging role of high tech industry such as
semiconductor industry in East Asian Economies (see Mathews and Cho (2000)).
3As mentioned before, there are few papers in the R&D literature that emphasise the role
of subsidies to R&D in promoting economic growth. For instance, Davidson and Segerstrom
(1998) distinguish between the role of innovative R&D and imitative R&D, and conclude that
subsidising innovative R&D promote growth while subsidising imitative R&D can be detrimental
to growth. General R&D subsidies, on the other hand, always exhert positive e®ects on growth.
Similar conclusions are reached by Segerstrom (2000) where the emphasis is between vertical versus
horizontal innovation. Even though our paper is not directly comparable with this strand of the
literature, in that we adopt the most simple model of innovation and look at di®erent issues (i.e.
macroeconomic stabilisation), it is interesting to note the similarities in the policy implications of
the two approaches.
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available to consumers during recessions is detrimental. On the one hand it can be
destabilising; more speci¯cally, if the steady state is globally stable under laissez
faire, the introduction of the tax makes cycles possible. On the other hand, such a
tax has negative welfare e®ects as it depresses output growth along the transitional
adjustment path. These results are at odd with the general presumption that
policies aimed at raising private saving (and, therefore, at expanding the resource
base of the economy) foster higher growth and welfare.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basics of
the economic model used. In Section 3 we derive the equilibrium dynamics, while
in Section 4 we present our results on the stabilising and destabilising e®ects of the
tax/subsidy. Finally we provide some concluding remarks in Section 5. Proofs of
propositions are relegated in the Appendix.
2 The Model
As in Matsuyama (1996) we assume that agents live for two periods. They work,
consume and save when young, and they only consume when old. There is a ¯nal
good, taken as numeraire, which is competitively produced, and is either consumed
or invested. The part invested is converted into a variety of di®erentiated inter-
mediate products, and associated with labour (exogenously ¯xed) according to a
Cobb-Douglas technology. The intermediate products are aggregated into a sym-
metric CES technology. The systematic study of the intermediate production pro-
cess makes it possible to specify the ¯nal good production function according to the
prevailing regime. In the case of the Solow (no innovation) regime, the production
function follows the traditional assumption of diminishing returns to scale. In the
case of the Romer (innovation) regime, the ¯nal good production function is of the
"AK" type. We depart from Matsuyama by assuming that in case of recessions, the
government intervenes by implementing tax and subsidy policy aimed at ensuring
a sustained growth path without downturns in economic activity.
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The details of the model are as follows. Time is discrete, t = 0; 1; :::. Agents
when young work and receive an income wtL, and pay (or receive) a lump sum tax
(subsidy) Bt, whereas when old they use all their savings for consumption. wt rep-
resents the real wage, L is the exogenously ¯xed labour supply, and the population
growth rate is zero. The utility function, Ut, of the representative consumer of each
generation is given by Ut = (1¡ s) ln c1t+ s ln c2t+1 where s is the saving rate, c1t is
the consumption when young and c2t+1 is the consumption when old. Maximising
utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint,4 c1t +
c2t+1
1+rt+1
= wtL + Bt
yields, a simple saving function, St
St = s (wtL+Bt) : (1)
In this economy there is one ¯nal good, taken as numeraire, which is competitively
produced and is either consumed or invested. The part invested is converted into a
variety of di®erentiated intermediate products, and the latter are aggregated into a
symmetric CES technology. Technology in the ¯nal goods sector is Cobb-Douglas,
hence, the ¯nal goods production function is given by (see Matsuyama 1999),
Yt = bA(L) 1¾ ½Z Nt
0
xt(z)dz
¾1¡ 1
¾
(2)
where xt(z) is the intermediate input of variety z 2 [0; Nt] and ¾ 2 (1;1) is the
elasticity of substitution between each pair of intermediate goods. It also follows
that 1
¾
is the labour share of the economy, since wtL =
Yt
¾
. Turning to the speci¯-
cation of the intermediate goods, we de¯ne xct as the intermediate input produced
in the competitive sector (with no innovation), and xmt the intermediate input pro-
duced by the monopolistic innovative sector. It is assumed that from period 0 to
period t ¡ 1 only 'old' intermediate goods are available in the market. The vari-
ety z 2 [0; Nt¡1] is produced under perfect competition with constant returns to
scale. From t ¡ 1 to t a range of 'new' intermediate goods z 2 [Nt¡1; Nt] may be
4The real interest rate is denoted by r.
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introduced. In this case, the variety z 2 [Nt¡1; Nt] is produced and sold exclusively
by the respective innovators in period t. Innovators operate under monopolistic
competition with no barriers to entry. New intermediate goods are produced by
using a units of capital per unit of output and require F units of output per variety.
The pro¯t function of each innovator ¦mt reads as,
¦mt = p
m
t x
m
t ¡ rt [axmt + F ] :
From the FOC it follows that pmt =
a¾rt
¾¡1 =
¾
¾¡1 . Since there are no barriers to
entry, the pro¯t (net of ¯xed cost) must be zero at all times, implying that 'new'
intermediate products (Nt ¸ Nt¡1) are introduced if and only if axmt 6 (¾ ¡ 1)F .
If innovators receive a lump sum subsidy (or pay a lump sum tax) the e®ect is
clearly to increase (or reduce) the incentive to enter by potential innovators. The
break even level of production is then xmt = (¾ ¡ 1) (F + aTt¡1) where Tt¡1 > 0
(Tt¡1 < 0) is a lump sum tax (subsidy) set by the government at the outset of
period t¡ 1. Demands for intermediate inputs come from the maximization of the
¯nal good pro¯t function, taking into account that all intermediate goods enter
symmetrically into the production of the ¯nal good, i.e. xt(z) ´ xct for z 2 [0;Nt¡1]
and xt(z) ´ xmt for z 2 [Nt¡1; Nt]. Under these assumptions,
xct
xmt
=
µ
pct
pmt
¶¡¾
=
µ
1¡ 1
¾
¶¡¾
:
The above implies that the demand for each intermediate input is,
xct =
1
a
µ¾F
µ
1 +
aTt¡1
F
¶
; µ ´
µ
1¡ 1
¾
¶1¡¾
(3)
xmt =
1
a
(¾ ¡ 1)F
µ
1 +
aTt¡1
F
¶
(4)
where µ 2 (1; e = 2:71::). This is a parameter related to the monopoly margin of
the innovator (i.e. 1
¾¡1). Thus, when ¾ is close to one µ ! 1, and when ¾ ! 1,
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µ ! e: Using the above relationships, the economy resource constraint on capital
in period t is,5
Kt¡1 = Nt¡1(axct) + (Nt ¡Nt¡1)(axmt + F ) : (5)
It then follows that when Nt = Nt¡1 (i.e. no innovation),
Kt¡1
Nt¡1
= axct
whereas, when Nt > Nt¡1 (i.e. innovation) substituting the expressions for demand,
(3) and (4), into the economy resource constraint on capital gives,
Nt = Nt¡1 +
Kt¡1
¾ (F + aTt¡1)
¡ µNt¡1 :
Letting kt ´ Ktµ¾FNt we obtain an expression governing the introduction of new
products,
Nt ¡Nt¡1 =Max Nt¡1
(
0;
µkt¡1
1 + aTt¡1
F
¡ µ
)
: (6)
The critical point at which innovation starts to be pro¯table is kcr ´ 1 + aTt¡1F .
In a symmetric equilibrium, total output, as in (2), is equal to
Yt = bA(L) 1¾ hNt¡1(xct)1¡ 1¾ + (Nt ¡Nt¡1)(xmt )1¡ 1¾ i :
Using the demand for the intermediate inputs, (3) and (4), the reduced form aggre-
gate production function for Nt = Nt¡1 is
Yt = At¡1
µ
1 +
aTt¡1
F
¶¡ 1
¾
(kt¡1)
¡ 1
¾ Kt¡1 ; (7)
while for Nt > Nt¡1 it becomes
Yt = At¡1Kt¡1 (8)
5Kt denotes the capital stock available at the end of period t. It corresponds to the amount
of ¯nal goods left un-consumed at the end of period t and carried over to period t + 1.
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where At¡1 ´ bAa
µ
aL
(1+
aTt¡1
F
)µ¾F
¶ 1
¾
. Note that under laissez faire, Tt¡1 = 0, At¡1 =
A ´ bA
a
¡
aL
µ¾F
¢ 1
¾ (as in Matsuyama (1999)). The reduced form aggregate production
of the ¯nal good is of the 'AK' type if Nt > Nt¡1 as in expression (8). Therefore,
if the resource base of the economy is large enough, kt¡1 > kcr, new products are
introduced and the economy evolves according to a 'Romer regime'. If the resource
base is not large enough, no innovation takes place and the aggregate production
function (i.e. expression (7)) exhibits decreasing returns to capital. Hence the
economy evolves according to a 'Solow regime'.
As shown in the section below, the equilibrium dynamics of the model simpli¯es
to a non-linear one-dimensional di®erence equation, well de¯ned in the forward
direction of time. The analysis of such one-dimensional equation (evaluation of the
steady state and its stability properties) allows us to study the evolution of the
economy between the two regimes within a single growth process.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics and Steady State
To derive the dynamic equilibrium we need to specify how capital accumulation
evolves over time. At equilibrium, saving equals investment, St = Kt; and the
government balances the budget, Bt = (Nt ¡Nt¡1)Tt¡1. The latter expression
implies that the lump sum tax on innovators (Tt¡1 > 0) is redistributed to the
consumers in the form of a lump sum subsidy. Equivalently, lump sum taxes levied
on the consumers (Tt¡1 < 0) ¯nance the subsidy distributed to the innovators.
Hence, the saving function, (1), can be written as
St = s
Yt
¾
+ s (Nt ¡Nt¡1) Tt¡1 :
Substituting for Nt¡Nt¡1 from (6) and Yt from either (7) or (8) into the expression
above we obtain capital Kt as
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Kt =
s
¾
"
At¡1Max
Ãµ
1 +
aTt¡1
F
¶ 1
¾
k
¡ 1
¾
t¡1; 1
!
Kt¡1
#
+sTt¡1Max Nt¡1
"
0; µ
Ã
kt¡1
1 + aTt¡1
F
¡ 1
!#
:
Dividing both sides of the above expression by µ¾FNt, the forward perfect foresight
dynamics of the system can be expressed as a one-dimensional map in k, ¤: <+ !
<+,
kt = ¤(kt¡1) ´ G (kt¡1)1¡
1
¾ (9)
if kt¡1 6 kcr
kt = ¤(kt¡1) ´ G
2664
³
(1 + aTt¡1
F
)¡
1
¾
´
kt¡1
1 + µ
µ
kt¡1
1+
aTt¡1
F
¡ 1
¶
3775+ sµ¾F Tt¡1
0BB@1¡ 1
1 + µ
µ
kt¡1
1+
aTt¡1
F
¡ 1
¶
1CCA
(10)
if kt¡1 ¸ kcr
where G ´ sA
¾
represents the growth potential of the economy at the laissez faire
equilibrium.
We proceed by ¯rst studying the equilibrium properties of the steady state under
laissez faire.6 Table 1 below summarises the stability properties of the steady state
under laissez faire.
Solow Romer
SS value k¤ = G¾ < 1 k¤¤ = G¡1
µ
+ 1 > 1
Stability
Properties of SS
Monotonic
convergence to SS
1 < G < µ ¡ 1 two¡ period cycles
G > µ ¡ 1 Non monotonic
convergence to SS
Table 1 - Steady State (SS) properties under laissez faire
6Setting Tt¡1 = 0 the dynamical system (9)-(10) is equivalent to that of Matsuyama (1996).
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The occurrence of two-period cycles depends on technology parameter values. Note,
in particular, the role played by the parameter µ ´ ¡1¡ 1
¾
¢1¡¾
implying µ 2 (1; e).
This parameter measures the extent to which the innovator looses market power if he
or she waits until the goods that he or she is competing with become competitively
priced. If intermediate goods are poor substitutes, the rate of obsolescence is high.
This triggers innovation. As intermediate goods become more substitutable the
economy may °uctuate between periods of positive innovation and zero innovation.
As substitutability of intermediate inputs increases the system switches to a regime
with no innovation at all. Low values of µ and su±ciently high values of G imply
an oscillatory convergence to a balanced growth path with innovation. Whereas
su±ciently small values of G imply a monotonic convergence to a stationary path
with factor accumulation and no innovation. For µ > 2 (implying ¾ > 2) there
exists a range of values of G such that the equilibrium growth path of the economy
°uctuates between a phase of capital accumulation and no innovation and a phase
of no factor accumulation and innovation.7
We are now well equipped to address the main issue of our investigation, that
is, to evaluate the growth and welfare e®ects of policies aimed at eliminating °uc-
tuations.
4 Stabilisation
First, note that in the 'Solow regime' where the economy monotonically converges
to the steady state there is clearly no scope for stabilisation. We focus therefore on
equilibrium dynamics situated in the 'Romer regime'.
Fluctuations are generally not seen as bene¯cial for the economy. Ideally, na-
tions would like to avoid growth pattern characterised by frequent upswings and
downturns in output growth. Moreover, they would aim at reaching high perma-
nent growth. In other words, they would aim at reaching a balanced growth path
7The empirical plausibility of the conditions for cycles is discussed in Matsuyama (1996), and
we refer the reader to Section 5 of his paper.
10
where there is enough innovation and, at the same time avoid cycles. In our model,
this implies ensuring: (i) that the economy will be situated in the Romer regime
where innovation is the engine of growth, rather than in the Solow regime with no
innovation and factor accumulation; (ii) that in the event of °uctuations, policy
should aim at bringing the system on a balanced growth path where the economy
grows (G > 1), rather than on a balanced growth path where the economy stays
stationary (G < 1).
To achieve a di®erent dynamic allocation with respect to the case of laissez
faire, the government has, in principle, a variety of policy options. We choose
to focus on the non-distorsive option of re-allocating resources between agents by
implementing an appropriate system of subsidies to the innovators ¯nanced by
lump-sum taxes on the consumer or vice versa. In this way, we can focus on purely
stabilising/destabilising e®ects of policy and not on policy that a®ect the steady
state as well. In particular, we assume that policymakers follow the following simple
stabilisation principle,
Tt¡1 = °(k¤¤ ¡ kt¡1); if kt¡1 < k¤¤ (11)
where the parameter ° represents the size of government intervention. This principle
implies that governments intervene only in the case of recessions, and it is meant
to represent a standard (countercyclical) macroeconomic policy. In particular if, at
the outset of period t ¡ 1 (i.e. beginning of period t), the government observes a
deviation of k from its long run trend, it may decide either to redistribute income
to the consumer by means of a lump sum tax on the innovators (° > 0) or, to
subsidise the innovators by taxing the consumer (° < 0).
Suppose that kt¡1 < k¤¤; the government then decides that in order to increase
output growth in the ¯nal good sector, innovators are to be subsidised by levying a
lump sum tax on the young consumers. The rationale for such a move is to create
an incentive for the innovators to produce new intermediate products which foster
higher production of the ¯nal good. This implies in turn higher consumption of the
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representative consumer once old. Similarly, the case of a tax levied on innovators
and redistributed to the young consumer reduces the potential growth of the ¯nal
good. This implies in turn lower consumption by the representative consumer once
old. To verify the validity of this conjecture in this particular economy we need to
study the e®ects of implementing the rule above on the dynamic properties of the
equilibrium.
When kt¡1 6 kcr (i.e. 'Solow regime') the dynamics remains the same as de-
scribed by (9). When kcr 6 kt¡1 6 k¤¤ (i.e. 'Romer regime') by using the proposed
rule, i.e. (11), into (10) the dynamics becomes,
kt = ¤(kt¡1) ´G
0@
³
(1 + a°
F
(k¤¤ ¡ kt¡1))¡ 1¾
´
kt¡1
1 + µ
³
kt¡1
1+ a°
F
(k¤¤¡kt¡1) ¡ 1
´
1A (12)
+
s
µ¾F
°(k¤¤ ¡ kt¡1)
0@1¡ 1
1 + µ
³
kt¡1
1+a°
F
(k¤¤¡kt¡1) ¡ 1
´
1A :
When kt¡1 ¸ k¤¤ the dynamics remains the same as in (10).
By construction, the steady state solution of (12) gives the same steady state
value of k as in the laissez faire equilibrium, i.e. k¤¤: The dynamic of adjustment,
on the other hand, di®ers. Note that the expression (12) cannot be di®erentiated
at k¤¤ (indeed ¤ has a kink at k¤¤ ), implying that ¤0(k¤¤) does not exist; however,
we can always compute the value of ¤0(k) when k tends to k¤¤ from the left, i.e.,
¤0¡(k
¤¤) =
a°
F
µ
k¤¤
¾
¡
µ
1 +
µ ¡ 1
G
¶
k¤¤ ¡ G¡ 1
AµF
¶
+
1¡ µ
G
: (13)
The value of ¤0(k) when k tends to k¤¤ from the right is equal to ¤0LF (k
¤¤), i.e.
¤
0
+(k
¤¤) = ¤0LF (k
¤¤) = 1¡µ
G
. Therefore, for any in¯nitely small neighbourhood of
the steady state the slope of the dynamics changes. Indeed, as discussed in Section
2, the introduction of a lump sum tax/subsidy changes the critical point at which
the economy moves from growth driven by factor accumulation to growth driven
by innovation. Taxing innovators and subsidising the consumer lowers the growth
12
kt
         0                 1      kcr  k** = kLF**                                  kt-1    
L LF(kt-1)
L(kt-1)
kHkL
Figure 1: The graph of ¤(kt¡1) for ° > 0 and G > µ ¡ 1
potential of the ¯nal output. Figure 1 illustrates by giving an example of the
changes in the transitional adjustment path. It also shows that this policy which is
aimed at stabilising the economy, may on the contrary exert a destabilising e®ect.
If (as in this example) the steady state is globally stable under laissez faire, the
introduction of a tax makes cycles possible. Moreover, as the economy moves from
being on the balance growth path to a stable two-period cycle growth is reduced,
implying lower welfare along the transition. The following propositions summarise
the results related to the implementation of the tax on innovators.
Proposition 1 (Stability properties of the steady state under tax on innovators).
If G > µ¡1 there is a °¤ > 0; such that for any ° > °¤ and for any kcr < kt¡1 < k¤¤;
¤0¡(k
¤¤) < ¡1. The steady state is unstable and there are equilibrium cycles of period
two.
Proof : See appendix.
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Increasing ° as a means to stabilise downward °uctuations in output, leads to
equilibrium cycles. Hence it is highly destabilising. In particular, as ° crosses °¤, a
°ip bifurcation occurs: the steady state looses stability and a stable cycle of period
two appears.8
Note also that such policy has negative welfare e®ects as it depresses output
growth along the transitional adjustment path.
Proposition 2 (Welfare properties of the adjustment path under tax on innova-
tors).
The average growth rate of the economy over the two-period cycles under a tax on
innovators is lower than the average growth rate of the economy under laissez faire
in the 'Romer regime'.
Proof : See appendix.
Propositions 1 and 2 establish that implementing a tax on innovators whose
receipts are redistributed to the consumer is detrimental for the economy. The
basic intuition is that reallocating resources from the innovators to the consumer
a®ects the balance between the two engines of growth, i.e. factor accumulation and
innovation. As the subsidy to the consumer ¯nanced through the lump sum tax on
the innovators increases, the economy moves from a situation in which innovation is
highly pro¯table to one in which innovation is less pro¯table. This implies that, as
the economy moves closer to a regime with no innovation and stationary growth it
can be trapped in a phase where it cycles between high innovation (and low factor
accumulation) and low innovation (and high factor accumulation).
However, if the government chooses the alternative option of taxing the young
consumer and redistributing the receipts to the innovators as a lump sum subsidy
the results are reversed. Figure 2 gives an example of the changes of the transitional
8To check for the stability properties of the two-period cycle we have simulated the model.
These simulations suggest that the cycle remains stable for a wide range of parameter values.
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adjustment path. It shows that this policy has a stabilising e®ect on the economy.
If (as in this example) the steady state is unstable under laissez faire and a two-
period cycle emerges, the introduction of a subsidy stabilises the economy and
higher welfare along the adjustment path is also achieved.9
The next propositions summarise the results related to the implementation of
the subsidy on innovators.
Proposition 3 (Stability properties of the steady state under subsidy on innova-
tors).
If G < µ ¡ 1 there is a °¤ < 0; such that for any °¤ < ° < ¡F
a
and for any
kcr < kt¡1 < k¤¤; ¡1 < ¤0¡(k¤¤) < 0. The economy monotonically converges to-
wards the steady state in the 'Romer regime' .
Proof : See appendix.
As regards welfare, such policy has positive e®ects in that it promotes output
growth along the transitional adjustment path.
Proposition 4 (Welfare properties of the adjustment path under subsidy on in-
novators).
The average growth rate of the economy under subsidy on innovators is higher than
the average growth rate of the economy under laissez faire.
Proof : See appendix.
The basic intuition is as follows. When the economy is in the 'Romer regime'
and exhibits equilibrium two-period cycles under laissez faire, a period of recession
(i.e. kt¡1 < k¤¤) corresponds to an equilibrium situated in the Solow regime and
to an increase in saving (i.e. ¤(kL) > ¤(k
¤)). This is due to the a-synchronisation
between innovation and investment activities that characterises this model (see
9To ensure 0 < kcr < 1 we impose ° < ¡Fa .
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kt
 0                kcr               1  k** =  kLF**                         kt-1    
L LF(kt-1)L(kt-1)
kHkL
Figure 2: The graph of ¤(kt¡1) for ° < 0, G < µ ¡ 1 and ¤(kcr) < ¤(k¤¤).
Introduction). In fact, if saving increases while the equilibrium is in the low growth
regime (i.e. the 'Solow' regime) more resources are directed to the production of
'old' intermediate goods to the detriment of the innovative sector which becomes less
pro¯table. Hence, the mechanism behind the appearance of equilibrium cycles is
ampli¯ed rather than reduced. As a consequence, to ensure stable sustained growth
saving must be directed towards innovation during a recession. Taxing the young
and distributing the proceeds to the innovators not only may bring stability but
it also increases the amount of goods available for both young and old. Therefore
total welfare in the economy is higher. In our model reallocating resources from the
consumer to innovators a®ects the properties of the balanced growth path of the
¯nal output; more speci¯cally, the economy switches from an equilibrium in which
it cycles between high innovation (and low factor accumulation) and low innovation
(and high factor accumulation) to the regime with innovation and sustained growth.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an OLG economy exhibiting sustained growth
through the implementation of subsidies to innovative sectors (¯nanced by a lump
sum tax on young consumers). The OLG structure makes possible to: (i) study
the dynamic properties of the economy by use of a one-dimensional map, which
makes the analysis simple and straightforward, (ii) explain how the reallocation of
resources between sectors and consumers a®ects the intergenerational exchanges.
Taxing the young and redistributing the proceeds to the innovative sectors brings
stability and increases the amount of goods available for both generations; hence it
also increases total welfare of the economy. This implies that fast growing economies
in which high factor accumulation plays a crucial role alongside innovative sectors
that enjoy temporary monopoly rents, should follow an unorthodox stabilisation
policy when they are facing recessions. They should tax the consumers and re-
distribute the receipts to the innovative sectors in form of subsidies. Evidence
suggests, for instance, that government funds in industrial R&D expenditures is by
far smaller in Japan than in other industrialised countries. Further, there is a clear
tendency that such government funding has decreased in amount and importance
over time, whereas the opposite has happened in other industrialised countries.10
Our model suggests that to reduce the growth gap the Japanese government should
maybe think of implementing a redistributive scheme by which consumers' savings
are 're-directed' towards innovation.
10See the evidence provided by Odagiri and Goto (1993), in particular Tables 3.2 and 3.3
presented in their paper.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
By direct inspection of (13): (i) ¤0¡(k
¤¤) < ¤0LF (k
¤¤); and (ii) ¤0¡(k
¤¤) is de-
creasing in °:¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume: kt¡2 = kH , kt¡1 = kL, kt = kH , kt+1 = kL, kt+2 = kH and so on, where
kL is situated in the 'Romer regime' and kH is situated in the 'Solow regime' (see,
e.g., Figure 1 in Section 4). This assumption implies that under our policy rule, see
(11), Tt¡2 = 0, Tt¡1 = °(k¤¤ ¡ kL), Tt = 0, Tt+1 = °(k¤¤ ¡ kL) and so on. In view of
this fact and given the dynamics as in (9)-(10), the rates of growth of all relevant
variables when the economy °uctuates every other period between the two regimes
are,
gNSolow ´
Nt
Nt¡1
= 1
gNRomer ´
Nt+1
Nt
= 1 + µ (kH ¡ 1) if kH > k¤
= 1 + µ
µ
kH
1 + a°
F
(k¤ ¡ kL) ¡ 1
¶
if kH < k
¤ ;
gKSolow ´
Kt
Kt¡1
=
kt
kt¡1
:
Nt
Nt¡1
=
kH
kL
=
G(kL)
1¡ 1
¾
kL
= G(kL)
¡ 1
¾
gKRomer ´
Kt+1
Kt
=
kt+1
kt
:
Nt+1
Nt
=
kL
kH
Nt+1
Nt
=
kL
kH
µ
1 + µ
µ
kH
1 + a°
F
(k¤ ¡ kH) ¡ 1
¶¶
if kH < k
¤
=
kL
kH
G if kH > k
¤ ;
gYSolow ´
Yt
Yt¡1
=
At¡1
³
1 + aTt¡1
F
´ 1
¾
(kt¡1)
¡ 1
¾ Kt¡1
At¡2Kt¡2
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= (kt¡1)
¡ 1
¾
kt¡1
kt¡2
:
Nt¡1
Nt¡2
= G (kL)
¡ 1
¾
gYRomer ´
Yt+1
Yt
=
AtKt
At¡1
³
1 + aTt¡1
F
´ 1
¾
(kt¡1)
¡ 1
¾ Kt¡1
= (kt¡1)
1
¾
kt
kt¡1
:
Nt
Nt¡1
= G if kH ¸ k¤
=
³
1 +
a°
F
(k¤ ¡ kH)
´¡ 1
¾
:G if kH < k
¤
The average growth rate over the two-period cycle is given by,
gYTax ´ (gYSolow :gYRomer)
1
2 = G(kL)¡
1
2¾
Under laissez faire (and k > kcr) the rate of growth of output is gYRomer = G.
To demonstrate that the latter is always higher than the average growth rate over
the cycle it su±ces to show that (kL)¡
1
2¾ < 1. This condition is always veri¯ed
since, under the tax on innovators the critical point moves from a value of 1 to a
value strictly higher than one, implying kL > 1 and therefore (kL)¡
1
2¾ < 1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us note that kcr < 1 < k¤¤.
If ¤ is increasing in k in the Romer regime (see Figure 2), then ¤(kcr) < ¤(1) <
¤(k¤¤). In addition, for any k 2 ( kcr; k¤¤) , ¤(k) > k then kt+1 = ¤(kt) > kt and
the economy monotonically converges to the steady state. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
From the section devoted to the proof of Proposition 2, we know the expres-
sions for gY under laissez faire and under subsidy/tax. Hence, gYLF ¡ gYSub =
(gYSolow :gYRomer)
1
2 ¡ gYSub = G
h
(kL)
¡ 1
2¾ ¡ ¡1 + a°
F
(k¤¤ ¡ kL)
¢¡ 1
¾
i
. If gYLF ¡ gYSub < 0
then () (kL)¡ 12¾ <
¡
1 + a°
F
(k¤¤ ¡ kL)
¢¡ 1
¾ () 1 + a°
F
(k¤¤ ¡ kL) < (kL)
1
2 ()
1+a°
F
k¤¤
1+ a°
F
<
kL
µ
k
¡ 12
L +
a°
F
¶
1+ a°
F
. Recall kcr =
1+ a°
F
(k¤¤¡kL)
1+a°
F
< kL. Now, let us show that
k
¡ 1
2
L +
a°
F
> 1 + a°
F
() k¡ 1¾L > 1 which is always true since kL < 1. Therefore
gYLF < gYSub . ¥
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